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Abstract
Secret sharing schemes are needed to store and protect secrets in large scale dis-
tributed systems. These schemes protect a secret by dividing the it into shares and
distributing the shares to multiple shareholders. This way the compromise of a single
shareholder does not reveal the secret. Many new secret sharing schemes, such as
Proactive Secret Sharing, have been developed to combat the increasing threat from
malicious nodes and keep systems secure. However, most of these schemes can be
compromised over time, since share transfer and redistribution are static: the set
of shareholders is fixed. Mobile Proactive Secret Sharing (MPSS) is a new protocol
with dynamic redistribution that can adapt to Byzantine faults and remain secure for
the duration of long-lived systems. This thesis describes the simulation, testing, and
evaluation of the MPSS protocol to better understand the performance trade-offs and
practicality of secret sharing protocols operating in Byzantine faulty environments.
The thesis evaluates the original MPSS scheme and the MPSS scheme with verifi-
able accusations in a distributed setting, finds that both schemes are practical, and
explores the performance trade-offs between the two schemes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Secret sharing schemes are needed to store and protect secrets in large scale dis-
tributed systems. These schemes protect a secret by dividing the it into shares and
distributing the shares to multiple shareholders. This way the compromise of a single
shareholder does not reveal the secret. Many new secret sharing schemes, such as
Proactive Secret Sharing, have been developed to combat the increasing threat from
malicious nodes and keep systems secure. However, most of these schemes can be
compromised over time, since share transfer and redistribution are static: the set
of shareholders is fixed. Mobile Proactive Secret Sharing (MPSS) is a new protocol
with dynamic redistribution that can adapt to Byzantine faults and remain secure for
the duration of long-lived systems. This thesis describes the simulation, testing, and
evaluation of the MPSS protocol to better understand the performance trade-offs and
practicality of secret sharing protocols operating in Byzantine faulty environments.
The thesis evaluates the original MPSS scheme and the MPSS scheme with verifi-
able accusations in a distributed setting, finds that both schemes are practical, and
explores the performance trade-offs between the two schemes.
1.1 Motivation for MPSS
This section identifies a motivating scenario for MPSS. The scenario we consider is a
company trying to protect a digital secret, namely a private key (e.g. the private key
that a certificate authority like Verisign, Inc. uses to sign its certificates). Companies
use their private keys to authentically distribute their software, to digitally sign their
documents, and to act as the basis for the company's digital identity. Therefore,
companies must protect their private keys or else they face disastrous consequences.
Furthermore, these companies have disparate data centers around the world which
all need access to private keys to perform company tasks. What is the best solution
for this company?
Using standard public key cryptography, where you generate a public/private key
pair to each key server is one solution. However, this solution presents a serious
key management problem: each key server is a single point of failure. Consider
the situation when a data center's key server is compromised; now the attacker has
full access to all of the company's operations. To recover from such an attack, the
company would have to regenerate its public/private key pair and reissue certificates
using the new key. This is a time intensive process that would have to occur on a
regular basis in order to prevent attacks.
Fortunately, these problems are solved by using MPSS. The secret sharing aspect
of MPSS protects a secret by distributing shares of the secret (i.e., the private key
of the public/private pair) to several nodes in the system, such that an attacker
would have to compromise more than a threshold, f, of nodes to gain access to the
secret. Instead of distributing the secret to the nodes, only cryptographic shares of the
secret are distributed. MPSS is proactive, performing share regeneration periodically,
in system-wide intervals called epochs, so that long-lived systems can remain secure
indefinitely. The secret is never revealed, provided that no more than f shareholders
are corrupted in a given epoch. Finally, MPSS can change the threshold for obtaining
the secret and change the shareholder membership of the secret. MPSS's mobility
enables it to adapt to security vulnerabilities by modifying shareholder membership
and increasing the system's threshold. MPSS provides a more resilient, secure, and
sustainable system for protecting secrets than previous solutions.
1.2 Contributions
The technique and protocol for MPSS were defined by Schultz and Liskov [Sch07]; the
contribution in this thesis is to implement an MPSS system, explore optimizations,
and measure performance in order to ascertain the true practicality of MPSS. The
thesis makes the following contributions:
1. MPSS Implementation - Implement a system that simulates the protocol and
design specifications in [SchO7].
2. MPSS Evaluation - Run experiments on the system to compare the behavior
of the system to the original intentions of MPSS.
3. MPSS Scalability - Run performance tests on the system to analyze the scala-
bility and practicality of MPSS.
4. MPSS Trade-offs - Explore the performance trade-offs of the original MPSS
scheme and the scheme that utilizes verifiable accusations.
We found that our implemented MPSS system matched expected performance of
the original MPSS protocol and was indeed scalable.
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes related work and the as-
sumptions of our system. Chapter 3 details the MPSS protocol. The implementation
and evaluation results of the system are discussed in Chapter 4. We conclude in
Chapter 5.

Chapter 2
Background and Assumptions
The first part of this chapter discusses the relevant theory and schemes that eventually
led to MPSS. The last part of the chapter discusses the assumptions we make about
the environment in which MPSS operates.
2.1 Background
Secret sharing, originally developed by Adi Shamir in 1975 [Sha79], is an algorithm
that provides information theoretical security to protect a given secret. The algorithm
creates a set of N shares for a secret that, alone, resemble random bits of information.
A threshold, f, is defined such that when more than f of the N shares are combined,
the algorithm can recover the secret, but with up to f shares, no information is
exposed. The algorithm works by generating a random degree-f polynomial, where
each share is a point on the polynomial. The secret is the value of the polynomial at
zero. When enough shares are combined, the points are interpolated to compute the
polynomial, which is then evaluated at zero to determine the secret. Even f shares
reveal nothing about the secret since there is a degree of freedom for the last, defining
point on the polynomial.
In the original proposal for secret sharing, there is one trusted node, known as the
dealer, which runs the secret sharing algorithm to distribute and recombine the shares
of the secret; the nodes that receive shares are known as shareholders. Verifiable
Secret Sharing (VSS), as described by Feldman et al. [Fel87], extends secret sharing by
allowing a semi-trusted dealer. A semi-trusted dealer cannot reveal the actual secret,
but it may trick other nodes by giving false shares. VSS adds extra commitment
information to each share, so that receiving nodes can verify the validity of their
share.
Although secret sharing adds security to a system by forcing attackers to compro-
mise more than f machines, over long periods of time, an attacker can accumulate
enough shares to eventually discover the secret. Proactive Secret Sharing (PSS) was
first described by Ostrovsky and Yung in 1991 [OY91], as an adaptation of secret
sharing to be able to handle compromises in a system over time. Their model oper-
ates under the assumption that nodes in their system can be infected by an adversary
at a certain rate, but nodes can also be restored to their correct state at an equal rate.
Under the original secret sharing scheme, over time, enough infected nodes will learn
all of the shares, allowing the adversary to recover the secret. Ostrovsky and Yung's
scheme introduces a refresh protocol with a system wide epoch that recomputes the
shares of the secret at the start of each epoch. Therefore, as long as the duration for
each epoch is less than the time for an adversary's rate of infection to infect more
than t nodes in the system, the secret can be preserved.
Ostrovsky and Yung proved that it was theoretically possible to build a PSS
system. However, Ostrovsky and Yung's PSS scheme is inefficient and impractical
due to its dependence on secure, multi-party computation, which is expensive, and
its assumption of a synchronous network. Herzberg et al. [HJKY95] improved upon
the scheme by making an efficient PSS protocol for synchronous networks. Although
impractical for real systems, these two works proved that it was possible to define a
PSS scheme, which has led to much of the follow-on work for secret sharing schemes.
Mobile Proactive Secret Sharing enhances PSS by preserving secrecy in asyn-
chronous networks even if nodes cannot be fully restored to a correct state. The
MPSS scheme gives the system the ability to change the number of shareholders,
redefine the set of shareholders to the secret, and adjust the threshold of the secret.
Now if the adversary suddenly increases the fraction of infected nodes, the system can
increase the threshold (i.e. number of shares of the secret) and increase the number
of shareholders to prevent the adversary from accessing the secret. MPSS eliminates
the assumption made by PSS that compromised nodes can be recovered back to their
correct states. The assumption is faulty due to the fact that it may be impossible
to determine if the node can ever be trusted again. Instead, MPSS makes a stronger
security guarantee by providing security even if nodes have been compromised. MPSS
uses the Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) algorithm [CL02] [CL99], in order to reach
system-wide agreement amongst non-faulty nodes. BFT guarantees the liveness and
safety of a system with 3f + 1 nodes as long as there are no more than f faulty nodes.
Thus, MPSS can guarantee correctness as long as the number of faulty nodes is no
larger than the threshold and by allowing the system to change the shareholders of
the secret.
A variant of MPSS, that is also explored in the thesis, is the scheme that uses
Verifiable Accusations. MPSS with Verifiable Accusations (MPSSVA) allows nodes
to verifiably accuse malicious nodes when detecting invalid data. A node receiving an
accusation can then verify cryptographically whether or not the accusation is justified.
The ability to verify optimizes certain parts of the protocol, when compared to MPSS.
The trade-off when using MPSSVA is the cryptographic overhead for producing and
analyzing Verifiable Accusations, and the extra storage space needed to append to
protocol messages.
2.2 Assumptions
2.2.1 Network Assumptions
MPSS operates under realistic network conditions, in which adversaries may exist.
This translates to the familiar asynchronous network security model, where messages
are sent peer to peer and can be delayed, reordered, or lost. We assume an adversary
can have complete control over the network and can decide to reorder the messages,
modify messages, and even create new messages. Under these conditions our protocol
will be correct, but in order to terminate and ensure liveness, our protocol requires the
network to have the property of strong eventual delivery. Strong eventual delivery
ensures that the maximum delay in message delivery for messages repeatedly sent
from uncorrupted nodes is bounded (with some unknown bound), and while that
bound can change over time, it does not increase exponentially indefinitely.
2.2.2 Cryptographic Assumptions
We use cryptography to both hide secret information and also to ensure that mes-
sages come from specific nodes. We require the following cryptographic assumptions:
We require collision-resistant hash functions such that it is infeasible for an adversary
to find a Y where hash(Y) = hash(X). SHA-256 is an example of a hash function
that is widely believed to be collision resistant and this is what our implementation
uses. Public Key Encryption and Decryption algorithms, such as RSA, make it in-
feasible for an adversary to decrypt information without the proper private key pairs.
Verifiable Secret Sharing is computationally secure under the Discrete Logarithm As-
sumption. MPSS uses forward-secure encryption and forward-secure signing, which
is computationally secure under the Bilinear Diffe-Hellman Assumption [BF01].
2.2.3 Adversarial Assumptions
We assume there exists a powerful adversary that is computationally bounded in
polynomial time, and can monitor all network traffic and corrupt nodes at a reasonable
rate. Once a node is corrupted, that node is corrupted forever and the adversary
automatically learns all of the information from that node. A corrupted node is
completely controlled by the adversary and can deviate from the protocol, send fake
messages, or even act like an honest node.
2.2.4 Epoch Assumptions
MPSS progresses in a series of epochs, such that a share during an epoch e is only
valid for that epoch. At the end of each epoch all share information is completely
erased before moving to the next epoch. We assume that an adversary can corrupt
no more than f nodes in a given epoch.

Chapter 3
MPSS Protocol
This chapter describes the original MPSS scheme and the MPSS scheme with Verifi-
able Accusations [Sch07]. For full descriptions of the protocols, we refer the reader to
[SchO7], as this chapter describes the protocols only in enough detail for the purposes
of this thesis. In the protocol, all messages are signed by the sender and encrypted for
the recipient using a forward-secure signature and forward-secure encryption scheme
respectively. We define a Participant to be a node in the protocol that owns a share
of the polynomial for the current epoch. We define the Primary to be the Participant
that coordinates the protocol. In the text, we write each message type of the protocol
in bold font with a MSG prefix.
3.1 Original MPSS Scheme
The MPSS protocol is composed of three main stages: proposal selection, agreement,
and share transfer. Proposal selection is the process by which all of the current
shareholders generate and select a new secret sharing polynomial for the next epoch.
Once a selection has been made, the agreement stage of the protocol commences, and
completes when a majority of non-faulty shareholders reach agreement on the selected
polynomial. The final stage of the protocol is the share transfer of the polynomial
from the group of existing shareholders to the new group of shareholders for the next
epoch. This section continues with a description of these stages in more detail.
3.1.1 Proposal Selection
During proposal selection, each node in the system proposes a group of 3f + 2 poly-
nomials of degree f, where f is the current threshold, by broadcasting a MSGPRO-
POSAL containing its proposals. These messages contain Feldman commitments
to the proposed polynomials; their details can be found in [Sch07]. Upon receiv-
ing 2f + 1 valid MSGPROPOSAL's, the Primary combines these proposals into a
proposal set, and broadcasts the MSGPROPOSALSET to all of the participants.
Each node inspects the MSGPROPOSALSET and sends a MSGPROPOSAL-
RESPONSE to the Primary with a list of the proposals it finds to be invalid (i.e.
corrupt). The Primary runs the online Proposal Selection Algorithm (PSA), shown
in Figure 3-1, as each MSGPROPOSALRESPONSE arrives until it satisfies the
PSA stop condition.
The PSA deterministically selects a subset of the original proposal set that is
guaranteed to contain at least one honest proposal. It accomplishes this by removing
any proposal from a node that has been accused and also a proposal from an accuser
node (since it cannot tell which node is bad). Each MSGPROPOSALRESPONSE
can only remove at most two proposals (the accuser and the accusee). Since at most
f nodes can be malicious, they can remove at most 2f proposals, and thus, there will
be at least one honest proposal left in the set.
At this point, the Primary has selected a final proposal set that it can use to
create a new polynomial to share the secret. The polynomial is created by linearly
combining the selected proposed polynomials; and has the property that each node
sees only a part of this polynomial and learns nothing about the rest of the polynomial
(more information can be found in [Sch07]).
3.1.2 Agreement
Once proposals have been selected, the Primary initiates a BFT [CL02] agreement for
its selected proposals. The value to be agreed upon by the participants is the resultant
set of selected proposals. Thus, the Primary sends its initial proposal set and the
Figure 3-1: Proposal Selection Algorithm (PSA) Pseudocode
1. d - 0, satisfied +- 0, rejected +- 0
2. props +- set of all proposals in MsgProposalSet
3. foreach MsgProposalResponse R from distinct node i
4. if i E rejected
5. continue
6. if 3j E R.BadSet such that j E props
7. props - props - {i,j}, rejected +- rejected U {i,j}
8. satisfied -- satisfied - {j}
9. d d+1
10. else
11. satisfied <-- satisfied U {i}
12. if Isatisfiedi = 2f + 1- d
13. stop
in-order set of MSGPROPOSALRESPONSE's it has received to participants.
A node votes by running the PSA on these inputs and determining if the output
equates to the Primary's selection. The BFT protocol operates with the standard
MSGBFTPREPREPARE, MSGBFTPREPARE, and MSGBFTCOMMIT
messages. A node can participate in the BFT phase even if it did not agree with the
selected proposals. If agreement is reached the protocol moves into the share transfer
stage. Otherwise, the Primary is faulty and a view change occurs forcing a restart of
the protocol with a new Primary.
3.1.3 Share Transfer
Upon reaching agreement, the Primary and all Participants send MSGNEWPOLY
messages based on the new polynomial to all Participants of the next epoch. When
a Participant from the current epoch receives at least f + 1 MSGNEWPOLY ac-
knowledgments, it deletes all of its current secret sharing information and progresses
into the new epoch, since at least one honest node has received the new polynomial.
A new Participant computes its own share when it has received f + 1 valid MS-
GNEWPOLY from old Participants; it holds on to these messages for the duration
of the next epoch in case some other new Participant never received the message.
3.1.4 Protocol Objects and Messages
Now we describe the different objects needed to run the protocol. There are underly-
ing secret sharing information objects such as the proposal polynomial and commit-
ments, and the protocol message objects. Here we describe the functionality and role
of these objects in the system.
Protocol Objects
Proposal - A sender node creates a proposal object for every Participant in the
protocol. For each Participant's proposal there is a set of 3f + 2 points, the
Participant's point on each of the 3f +2 polynomials the sender node generated.
Each proposal is encrypted for its intended Participant. The object is O(f) in
size.
Commitment - A commitment object provides the information necessary for a node
to verify that the proposal was generated properly and unmaliciously. Commit-
ments are essential for the protocol to generate secure shares and a trusted
polynomial. There is one commitment object for each of the 3f + 2 polynomials
generated by the sender. Each commitment is composed of f + 1 points per
proposal point for a total of (3f + 2)(f + 1) = 3f 2 + 5f + 3 points.
AgreementValue - This object is used during the BFT agreement phase of the
protocol as the value to be agreed upon by all of the participants. The Agree-
mentValue consists of a hash of the proposal set and the ordered set of responses
that the Primary used as input to the PSA to select the final set of proposals.
A shareholder can then rerun the PSA with these inputs to verify the Primary
reached the same set of proposals. The size of an AgreementValue is O(f2 ).
Protocol Messages
MSGPROPOSAL - This message contains the proposal for the share generation
polynomial for every node in the system along with the commitments to the
polynomials. The size of this message is O(f 2).
MSGPROPOSALSET - This message sent by the Primary contains the hashes of
2f + 1 MSGPROPOSAL's the Primary received along with the identifiers of
their senders. The size of a proposal set message is O(f).
MSGPROPOSALRESPONSE - This message is the Participant response to a
MSGPROPOSALSET, where the Participant identifies the proposals it be-
lieves are invalid along with a hash of the original MSGPROPOSALSET. A
node votes on what the Primary sent, so the size of the message is O(f).
MSGBFTPREPREPARE - The Primary sends this message when it has selected
a set of proposals for the rest of the Participants to agree on. The message
consists of the AgreementValue that other nodes must vote on. As noted earlier
an AgreementValue has a size of O(f 2), so the size of a MSGBFTPREPRE-
PARE is also O(f 2).
MSGBFTPREPARE - This message is a vote that contains a hash of the Agree-
mentValue. Size is 0(1).
MSGBFTCOMMIT - This message commits to the hash of the AgreementValue
in the final round of BFT agreement. Size is 0(1).
MSGNEWPOLY - Much like a MSGPROPOSAL, this message contains points
on the new polynomial that will be used to generate the new shares for each
member in the new group. The polynomial is a linear combination of all the
polynomials that were agreed to in the AgreementValue object and commit-
ments, such that recipients of a MSGNEWPOLY can only generate their
own shares and nothing else. The message size is equivalent to a MSGPRO-
POSAL, O(f 2).
3.1.5 State Machine
We can describe the protocol as a finite state machine for a better understanding
of MPSS (a diagram is shown in Figure 3-2). We only cover the transitions for
the normal case of the protocol and we leave out transitions that would occur from
message reordering and faulty nodes.
The Participant node maintains a state for each stage of the protocol in which it
participates.
WAIT - This is the beginning state, where the Participant waits until the Primary
sends a MSGSTARTPROTOCOL. The MSGSTARTPROTOCOL is a
message artifact from our implementation that synchronizes the initiation of
the protocol, but the protocol does not necessarily have to start in this manner.
The Participant then broadcasts its MSGPROPOSAL to initiate the MPSS
protocol and transitions to the PROPOSALSENT state once it has sent all of
the messages.
PROPOSALSENT - In this state the node is idle until it receives a MSGPRO-
POSALSET from the Primary, in which case it validates the message, sends
a MSGPROPOSALRESPONSE to the Primary, and moves into the PRO-
POSAL_RESPONSE-SENT state.
Primary Participant
-I
I I
I I
I I
COMMITSENT
I I
ivesj2F+1 MsgBFTommit's,
broqdcasts the MsyNewPoly.
I I END
I I
------------ -------- I..........................
Figure 3-2: MPSS FSM Diagram
PROPOSALRESPONSE_SENT - The Participant waits for a MSGBFTPREPRE-
PARE to begin the BFT agreement phase of MPSS. Upon receiving the mes-
sage, the Participant runs the PSA to verify that the polynomial value be-
ing agreed on is indeed a valid value. If satisfied, the Participant will broad-
cast a MSGBFTPREPARE to all shareholders and transition to the PRE-
PARESENT state. If unsatisfied, or if the node never receives a MSGBFT-
PREPREPARE, the node can still progress to the COMMIT-SENT or END
states if it receives 2f + 1 MSGBFTPREPARE's or MSGBFTCOMMIT's
respectively.
PREPARESENT - In this state the Participant waits until it receives 2f + 1,
distinct MSGBFTPREPARE messages, including its own, so that it can
broadcast a MSGBFTCOMMIT to all of the Participants and move into the
COMMITSENT state. Similar to the PROPOSALRESPONSESENT state,
the node can proceed to the END state if it receives 2f + 1 MSGBFTCOM-
MIT's before it receives 2f + 1 MSGBFTPREPARE's.
COMMIT_SENT - Once a node has received 2f + 1 MSGBFTCOMMIT's, the
protocol has agreed on a new share distribution polynomial, and the node can
broadcast the MSGNEWPOLY to the members of the new group. When the
node receives f + 1 acknowledgments, it can transition to the END state.
END - The terminating state of the protocol.
The Primary node acts as both a Primary and a Participant throughout the
protocol. Here is the Primary State Machine:
PROPOSAL_WAIT - This is the initial state of the Primary when the protocol
begins. The Primary broadcasts a MSGSTARTPROTOCOL to all share-
holders to start sending MSGPROPOSAL's. Upon receiving 2f + 1 MSG-
PROPOSAL's, the Primary collects all the proposals into a proposal set and
broadcasts a MSGPROPOSALSET message to all of the shareholders, mov-
ing into the PROPOSALSETSENT state.
PROPOSAL_SETSENT - The Primary runs the online PSA as it receives MS-
GPROPOSALRESPONSE messages. Once the stop condition is reached,
the Primary broadcasts a MSGBFTPREPREPARE message to all of the
shareholders to begin the BFT agreement phase and moves into the PREPRE-
PARESENT state.
PREPREPARESENT - The Primary immediately sends a MSGBFTPRE-
PARE to all participants and moves to the PREPARESENT state, whereupon
it progresses through the rest of the protocol states like a Participant.
Figure 3-3: Timeline of the MPSS protocol
Figure 3-3 illustrates how the Primary and Participant state machines interact to
form the underpinnings of the protocol. Although this timeline shows the ideal pro-
gression of the protocol, nodes that are behind can still participate in the agreement
and share transfer stages.
3.2 MPSS with Verifiable Accusations
A variant of MPSS, which is also explored in the thesis, is the scheme that uses
Verifiable Accusations.
The goal of the MPSS with Verifiable Accusations (MPSSVA) scheme is to make
the proposal selection process more efficient. Under the original MPSS scheme, a node
had no way of determining whether incoming MSGPROPOSALRESPONSE's
were honest or malicious. Therefore both the accuser and the accused nodes' propos-
als were removed from the selection process to ensure security. MPSSVA improves
upon this process by including verifiable accusations in the MSGPROPOSAL-
RESPONSE, which allows other nodes to cryptographically verify the claims and
accurately identify whether the accuser or the accused node is malicious. In order
to implement this scheme, some protocol objects and methods must be modified and
augmented to make use of verifiable accusations:
Proposal - The proposal object must now use forward-secure, identity-based encryp-
tion to encrypt the contained information, the details of which can be found in
[Sch07]. The message size increases due to the encryption scheme.
Accusation - An accusation object consists of an accusation against a node along
with the identity based authentication key of the accuser node.
AccusationSet - An accusation set contains all of the accusations from a particular
node.
MSGPROPOSALRESPONSEACCUSE - This is the MSGPROPOSALRE-
SPONSE object for MPSSVA with an AccusationSet. The functionality of
this message remains the same.
PROPOSALWAIT (Primary State) - The duration of the time the Primary
spends in this state can be shortened with verifiable accusations. The primary
only needs to receive f + 1 MSGPROPOSAL's instead of the original 2f + 1,
to create the proposal set object and move into the PROPOSALSETSENT
state.
Figure 3-4: PSA for Verifiable Accusations (PSAVA) Pseudocode
1. responses +- 0
2. props -- set of all proposals in MsgProposalSet
3. foreach MsgProposalResponse R from distinct node i
4. foreach accusationj E R.AccusationSet
5. if accusation,j is valid
6. props - props - {j}
7. else
8. props - props - {i}
9. responses - responses + 1
10. if responses 2 2f + 1
11. stop
Proposal Selection Algorithm with Verifiable Accusations (PSAVA) - The
proposal selection algorithm becomes almost trivial, since each valid accusation
in a MSGPROPOSALRESPONSEACCUSE results in exactly one exclu-
sion, the algorithm acts as a counter for at least 2f +1 responses to select a final
set of proposals to generate the new polynomial. This version of the algorithm
may require fewer node responses than the original algorithm. Since exclusions
will only remove the faulty nodes, the algorithm may converge on the selection
more quickly.

Chapter 4
Evaluation
To implement and evaluate the MPSS protocol we built a system that adheres to
the protocol specifications outlined in the MPSS [SchO7] design. Then we evaluated
the system's performance using values of f in the range of 1 to 7. Throughout the
evaluation process we are only interested in the performance for the "normal" (i.e.
non-faulty) behavior of the system, since this will be the most common case for the
system in practice. We used this approach to evaluate the original MPSS scheme as
well as MPSSVA.
4.1 Implementation
4.1.1 Pragmatic Development
MPSS is a system that intertwines state-of-the-art cryptography, Byzantine fault tol-
erance, and distributed systems. Due to the complexity of these components, we
chose to focus our efforts on the most significant aspects of the protocol and imple-
ment the rest through simulation. For example, MPSS relies on several cryptographic
tools for which efficient designs have been proposed only recently, such as forward-
secure signatures and forward-secure identity-based encryption. To the best of our
knowledge, no implementations of these are publicly available. Rather than build-
ing prototypes that may not be entirely correct or reflective of the performance of
a production implementation, we chose to simulate these methods using time delays
proportional to the number of operations (i.e. modular multiplications and exponen-
tiations) required, and incorporated the space requirement of the encryption scheme
into the message sizes.
We focused our implementation on the MPSS redistribution protocol, focusing
more on the Byzantine fault tolerance and distributed systems aspects, rather than
the cryptographic and mathematical details of the system.
4.1.2 Development Methodology
The development methodology was an iterative process that used the concepts and
protocol designs from Schultz's thesis [Sch07l to build a high level system, then incor-
porate the lower level details of the protocol, validated the behavior of the protocol,
and finally optimized for performance. Unit testing was performed at each of these
steps to ensure correctness of the system. The goal of building a modular, skeletal
implementation was to to ease the future development of the different MPSS schemes.
This methodology led to a better system design by decoupling components and in-
creasing the robustness of the system as a whole.
Our protocol can run over either TCP or UDP. TCP is not the right choice in
practice because it has several properties that are unneeded baggage for MPSS (e.g.,
message ordering and retransmission of messages is not relevant). However, we ran
our tests using TCP instead of UDP because our UDP implementation has other
issues, e.g., for large broadcasts, it fills the kernel's network buffer space, resulting in
dropped packets.
An important aspect of developing the MPSS system was to make it easily con-
figurable to deploy and run on multiple machines under different environments and
different settings. The flexibility of the system facilitated diverse performance testing
which resulted in a strong evaluation of the system.
Scaling the system involved progressively increasing the number of nodes in the
protocol from f = 1 to f = 7, and from local machines to more distributed and
diverse environments, such as Emulab [WLS+02]. We scaled to a maximum of f = 7
because previous work [Che04] has shown that it is unlikely that a larger value of
f will be needed in practice. Emulab was essential to scale the system to these
dimensions, since our local PMG computer lab did not have the resources necessary
for large values of f.
4.1.3 Development Environment
MPSS was implemented under the following development environments. Within the
Programming Methodology Group, we used Fedora Core 6, Linux based machines
with processors of at least 600MHz. All machines were connected in a 1Gb/sec
Ethernet Local Area Network (LAN). MPSS itself was developed in C++, using the
GNU C++ Compiler Version 4.1.1. MPSS used the following external C++ libraries:
Botan, the BSD-licensed cryptography library version 1.6.4, and NTL version 5.4.2.,
a C++ library for number theory developed by Victor Shoupe. Python version 2.4.4
was used to write the scripts necessary run the protocol on remote machines and
collect the protocols performance results in an automated fashion. GNU Profiler was
used to examine the performance of the system and identify possible optimizations.
GNUPlot version 4.0 was used to graph the performance measurements.
4.2 Experimental Framework
We evaluated our system using two testing frameworks: a local testbed and an Emulab
testbed. We tested locally during development to assess and validate the behavior of
the system for small values of f, and to be able to rapidly prototype the system. The
Emulab testbed was used for real performance testing of the system as we scaled to
large values of f.
4.2.1 Local Testbed
The first set of evaluations was performed under the local PMG environment. The
PMG environment consists of 10 Linux based PCs running Fedora Core 6 with a
range of 600MHz 2.0GHz of processing power connected to each other on a 1Gb/sec
Ethernet LAN. None of these machines were purely dedicated, since they are all
shared by members in PMG. Since there were not enough physical machines to test
MPSSs scalability up to f = 7, getting the necessary number of nodes required using
multiple ports per machine. A variety of environment setups were used to gage the
correlation of physical nodes to performance. The local testbed was mainly used to
get rough estimates on the practicality and performance of the system. Small tweaks
and changes to the protocol could be analyzed quickly on a real system, and most of
the testing of the protocol was performed on this testbed before scaling to the upper
extremes.
4.2.2 Emulab Testbed
To evaluate MPSS in a more realistic setting where nodes may be distributed across
the world with different bandwidth and network delays, we used the Emulab Total
Network Testbed [WLS+02]. Emulab is a service provided by the University of Utah
that allows researchers to develop, debug, and test distributed programs in a simulated
network environment. The researcher is able to configure the network topology and
behavior, such as throughput and latency, in order to test under desired settings.
The researcher can also specify the machine types to use in the experiment. We set
up the environment with homogeneous 3.0GHz machines with 2GB of RAM. Once
an experiment is active on the Emulab network, the researcher has full root access
to the deployed machines, and is free to run the program of his or her choosing.
Using Emulab, we were able to get performance results for f = 7 with dedicated
machines and configure the network to resemble a realistic scenario for MPSS. We
ran performance tests on two different network topologies for each value of f:
Low Latency - All machines were simulated to be connected to a high throughput
(100Mb/s), low latency LAN. This test resembles a system where all nodes
reside in a single, high speed data center. Although unrealistic, this topology
allows us to examine the behavior of the protocol under near-optimal conditions.
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Figure 4-2: A sample geographic distribution of data centers across the U.S. with
ping times.
High Latency - Nodes are located in data centers with geographic distribution and
data independence from each other, such that there is delayed communication.
All nodes are operating with high bandwidth (100Mb/s) connections with vary-
ing latencies, ranging from 5ms to 100ms delays. This deployment is of most
interest since it represents the most realistic scenario for an MPSS system,
where nodes are spatially distributed from each other, Figure 4-2 shows an ex-
ample. We consider the spatial distribution of nodes to be uniform, and that
the Primary is located near the geographic center of the network.
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Figure 4-3: High latency network topology for f = 2.
4.3 Evaluation Results
4.3.1 Performance Metrics
To determine the practicality and scalability of MPSS, we identified a set of key
performance metrics that the protocol evaluation must reflect: network throughput,
protocol duration, and maximum load on each node. Network throughput is impor-
tant because it is the real cost of running the protocol. Making sure the protocol's
duration is minimal is important because a protocol that takes too long is not viable
in practice. Additionally, the longer the protocol takes to complete the more feasible
it becomes for an adversary to discover the secret within a given epoch. By evaluating
each of these metrics while scaling the protocol from f = 1 to f = 7, we can assess
the true practicality of the system under realistic scenarios.
4.3.2 Validation Metrics
During the testing of MPSS we created validation metrics to ensure appropriate
system behavior. We generated benchmarks to compare the protocol's performance
to its theoretical expectations. To do so, we formulated f-dependent relationships for
the different performance metrics, namely number of messages in the protocol, total
data throughput, and protocol duration. Each validation metric is based on ideal
system behavior, where we define ideal behavior for the system as operating with
the minimum amount of message passing. Our analysis is based on the specifications
from [Sch07] for the Primary node and the derivations for the message behavior and
bandwidth requirements for MPSS and MPSSVA can be found in Appendix A and
Appendix B respectively. Below we show the message sizes with ".s"for both schemes,
and present our protocol duration analysis.
Message Sizes
To compute message size, the space requirement of the cryptographic scheme must
be taken into account. Figure 4-4 shows the cryptographic space costs for MPSS and
MPSSVA, and Figures 4-5 and 4-6 display the message sizes for each scheme for the
different values of f.
Parameter MPSS MPSSVA
Encryption Space 768 bytes 1088 bytes
Signature Space 1024 bytes 768 bytes
Figure 4-4: MPSS and MPSSVA Cryptographic Space Requirements
Message f= 1 f = 2 f=3 f =4 f =5 f =6 f =7
MSGSTARTPROTOCOL.s 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
MSGPROPOSAL.s 6408 13128 22152 33480 47112 63048 81288
MSGPROPOSALSET.s 1160 1240 1320 1400 1480 1560 1640
MSGPROPOSALRESPONSE.s 1072 1072 1072 1072 1072 1072 1072
MSGBFTPREPREPARE.s 4372 6596 8820 11044 13268 15492 17716
MSGBFTPREPARE.s 1036 1036 1036 1036 1036 1036 1036
MSGBFTCOMMIT.s 1036 1036 1036 1036 1036 1036 1036
MSGNEWPOLY.s 3328 5824 9472 14272 20224 27328 35584
Figure 4-5: MPSS Messages Sizes (bytes) for f = 1 to 7.
Message f = 1 f = 2 f = 3 f =4 f =5 f =6 f =7
MSGSTARTPROTOCOL.s 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
MSGPROPOSAL.s 7432 15112 25096 37384 51976 68872 88072
MSGPROPOSALSET.s 864 904 944 984 1024 1064 1104
MSGPROPOSALRESPONSE.s 816 816 816 816 816 816 816
MSGBFTPREPREPARE.s 3052 4724 6396 8068 9740 11412 13084
MSGBFTPREPARE.s 780 780 780 780 780 780 780
MSGBFTCOMMIT.s 780 780 780 780 780 780 780
MSGNEWPOLY.s 3072 5568 9216 14016 19968 27072 35328
Figure 4-6: MPSSVA Messages Sizes (bytes) for f = 1 to 7.
Protocol Duration
The duration of the protocol is an accumulation of the computation time for each
message and the travel time for each message across the network. To generate a
formula we first need to define the computations required for each type of message.
We have 4 types of computations: encryption(E), decryption(D), message signing(S),
and signature verification(V). Other computations such as generating the proposals,
generating commitments, and validating message objects are not taken into account
in this model. The table below denotes the computations necessary for sending and
receiving each message. It is important to note that the encryption and signature of a
message needs to be performed only once before broadcasting that message, however
the decryption and verification of a message must be done for each incoming message.
Figure 4-7: MPSS Messages Computation Formulas
Using the relationships from message behavior and data throughput, we can find
the total computation time for the Primary (we use ".cs" and ".cr" to denote send
and receive computation time, respectively).
Comp. Time = Computations to Send + Computations to Receive
= ((3f + 1)MSGPROPOSAL.cs + (1)MSGPROPOSALSET.cs
+(1)MSGPROPOSALRESPONSE.cs + (3f + 1)MSGNEWPOLY.cs)
+((2f + 1)MSGPROPOSAL.cr + (1)MSGPROPOSALSET.cr
+(2f + 1)MSGPROPOSALRESPONSE.cr)
= (((3f + 1)E + S) + (S) + (S) + ((3f + 1)E + S))
+(((2f + 1)(D + V)) + (V) + ((2f + 1)V))
= 2(3f + 1)E + 4S + (2f + 1)D + (2(2f + 1) + 1)V
S(6f + 2)E + 4S + (2f + 1)D + (4f + 3)V
The transit time for all the messages is shown below:
Message Sending Receiving
MSGPROPOSAL (3f+1)E+S D+V
MSGPROPOSALSET S V
MSGPROPOSALRESPONSE S V
MSGNEWPOLY (3f+1)E+S D+V
Transit Time - Bytes Sent + Bytes Received Data ThroughputTransit Time + LatencyBandwidth Bandwidth
Therefore, the total protocol duration can be calculated:
Protocol Duration = Computation Time + Transit Time
Data Throughput
= (6f + 2)E + 4S + (2f + 1)D + (4f + 3)V + a
Bandwidth
+Latency
Using the models above with the appropriate system environment parameters
yield reasonable performance benchmarks for our MPSS system. We also use the
same approach to generate benchmarks for MPSSVA: The analysis can be found in
Appendix B. We ran environment tests to estimate the computation parameters:
E,D,S, and V and their respective space requirements. The results are shown in
Figure 4-8.
4.3.3 Evaluation
Based on the metrics we identified, we tested MPSS's performance by computing
the number of messages sent over the network, the total amount of bytes sent and
received by nodes in the protocol, and the total duration of the protocol. For each
test, we ran the system without malicious nodes in order to discern standard behavior
of the system. We ran each of these tests at least 10 times for each value of f. We
emphasized the performance of the Primary node since it handles the highest load in
the system.
We ran the same tests for MPSSVA in order to compare the differences between
MPSS and MPSSVA. It should be noted that our implemented MPSS and MPSSVA
systems simulated many of the advanced forward-secure encryption, forward-secure
signature, and commitment generation techniques. However, since none of the tech-
niques have production implementations, we approximated the overhead of these
schemes to the best of our knowledge. Hence, we only claim the performance our
systems to be on the same order of magnitude of complete implementations. Figure
4-8 denotes the different system parameters we used for MPSS and MPSSVA.
Figure 4-8: MPSS and MPSSVA System Parameters
The legend for each graph is located in its top right corner. The rest of this section
describes the results of our analysis.
Message Behavior
Messages Sent vs. F
1 2 3 4 5
Size of F
Figure 4-9: MPSS vs. MPSSVA Messages Sent Comparison at the Primary
Parameter MPSS MPSSVA
E 12ms 17ms
D 12ms 17ms
S 10ms 10ms
V 2ms 2ms
Figure 4-9 shows the number of
MPSSVA grows linearly with f.
ber of messages in both schemes.
messages received by the Primary.
messages sent by the Primary in MPSS and in
As expected, the Primary sends the same num-
Similar results can be found for the number of
Bandwidth Requirement
Figure 4-10 shows that MPSSVA requires more bandwidth than the original MPSS
scheme. This is due to the verifiable accusation cryptographic overhead, which in-
creases message size. The important thing to note is that bandwidth utilization grows
on the order of O(f 2), resulting from the quadratic growth of MSGPROPOSAL
message size. At f = 7, the Primary is sending close to 2MB of data in the protocol.
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Figure 4-10: MPSS vs. MPSSVA Bytes Sent Comparison at the Primary.
Protocol Duration
We tested the total time it takes to run the protocol from the Primary's perspective.
We measured the duration of the protocol as being the time from when the Primary
initiates the protocol to the share transfer of the polynomial to the new group of
shareholders. We compared the latency of MPSS and MPSSVA under the two differ-
ent network topologies. The goal of the tests is to show that the protocol terminates
in a reasonable amount of time and determine whether verifiable accusations is useful.
MPSSVA might be more expensive because of cryptographic costs and larger message
sizes, but it might be faster because the Primary does not have to wait for as many
MSGPROPOSAL's.
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Figure 4-11: MPSS vs. MPSSVA Duration Comparison (low latency)
Figure 4-11 shows the performance of MPSS and MPSSVA in the low latency
topology. MPSS clearly outperforms MPSSVA in this scenario. Since there is no
latency in the network, the cryptographic overhead is the major difference between
the two schemes. MPSSVA has more expensive encryption and decryption costs,
resulting in slower performance. As f increases, we see the gap between MPSS and
MPSSVA increase as well, due to the linear increase in the number of cryptographic
computations.
Based on the system parameters, not all of the overhead shown in Figure 4-11
is due to cryptographic overhead. Some of the overhead is due to the time required
to send all of the messages. For instance, for MPSS at f = 7, subtracting the cryp-
tographic overhead, 568ms, from the total duration, 1051ms, results in 483ms of
bandwidth cost, or 33Mb/s. The effective bandwidth is less than expected, operat-
ing between 25Mb/s and 33Mb/s; presumably caused by the Emulab network using
shared links between the nodes.
Figure 4-12 shows the results of MPSS and MPSSVA in the high latency topology,
a more realistic network. We found that MPSS performs slightly better than MPSSVA
when f is small. Verifiable accusations do not seem to have a significant impact on
the protocol, so in practice MPSS should suffice.
Due to the prolonged duration of the protocol under this topology, the number
of test runs was reduced, accounting for some of the measurement variations in the
graph (e.g., there is an anomaly at f = 4 that is not fundamental to the protocol).
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Figure 4-12: MPSS vs. MPSSVA Duration Comparison (high latency)
Within the parameters of our scenario MPSS performs well, running in under 4
seconds for the largest values of f. The bandwidth is also reasonable for the protocol,
considering how infrequently it is run. MPSS's short protocol duration, reasonable
data consumption, and low resource intensity make it a practical system.

Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Discussion
We have presented implementations of MPSS and MPSSVA and evaluated their per-
formance in both a high-speed LAN and also in a deployment resembling the Internet.
Our results show that we were able to scale these systems to the desired values of f,
in order to ascertain the practicality of these systems. We showed that MPSS per-
forms at least as well as MPSSVA in both latency and bandwidth for every network
topology that we examined, but both systems are scalable and would be practical for
a real usage scenario.
5.2 Future Work
To gain more insight into MPSS and other secret sharing schemes, more implementa-
tion and evaluation of these schemes is necessary. For MPSS in particular, we focused
on implementing the redistribution protocol and simulated the cryptographic aspects
of the system. A logical next step would be to implement the entire MPSS system
with all of the cryptographic elements. We only focused on analyzing MPSS perfor-
mance under normal, non-faulty behavior. Future analysis should focus on MPSS's
performance with faulty nodes.

Appendix A
MPSS Validation Metrics
Here are the calculations for the MPSS Validation benchmarks.
A.1 Message Behavior
The Primary's message behavior can be divided into its message sending behavior
and its message receiving behavior. Our analysis assumes the primary sends mes-
sages to itself, e.g., it sends itself the start command, and also the proposal. Our
implementation works this way, but clearly it could be improved to avoid these mes-
sages. Under ideal circumstances the Primary will broadcast to 3f + 1 nodes, so the
message sending behavior can be characterized as follows:
Msgs Sent = (3f + 1)MSGSTARTPROTOCOL's + (3f + 1)MSGPROPOSAL's
+(1)MSGPROPOSALSET + (1)MSGPROPOSALRESPONSE
+(3f + 1)MSGBFTPREPREPARE's + (3f + 1)MSGBFTPREPARE's
+(3f + 1)MSGBFTCOMMIT's + (3f + 1)MSGNEWPOLY's
= (3f+1)+(3f+1)+1+1+(3f+1)+(3f+1)+(3f+1)+(3f+1)
= 6*(3f+1)+2
= 18f + 8
For messages received, we use the same analysis. Since it is operating ideally, only
2f + 1 nodes are required to continue to different stages in the protocol. We get the
following relationship for messages received:
Msgs Rec = (1)MSGSTARTPROTOCOL's + (2f + 1)MSGPROPOSAL's
+(1)MSGPROPOSALSET + (2f + 1)MSGPROPOSALRESPONSE's
+(1)MSGBFTPREPREPARE + (2f + 1)MSGBFTPREPARE's
+(2f + 1)MSGBFTCOMMIT's
= 1+ (2f + 1) + 1+ 1 + (2f+1)+(2f+1)+(2f + 1)
= 4*(2f+1)+3
= 8f+7
A.2 Bandwidth Requirement
Data throughput is calculated in a similar manner to the messages in the previous
section. The only difference is that the size of the message is taken into account (we
use ".s" to denote message size). The actual size of each message is dependent on the
value of f and the cryptographic overhead; Figure 4-5 shows the different message
sizes for each value of f. Therefore, we get the following results for bytes sent and
received from the Primary:
Bytes Sent = (3f + 1)MSGSTARTPROTOCOL.s + (3f + 1)MSGPROPOSAL.s
+(1)MSGPROPOSALSET.s + (1)MSGPROPOSALRESPONSE.s
+(3f + 1)MSGBFTPREPREPARE.s + (3f + 1)MSGBFTPREPARE.s
+(3f + 1)MSGBFTCOMMIT.s + (3f + 1)MSGNEWPOLY.s
Bytes Rec = (1)MSGSTARTPROTOCOL.s + (2f + 1)MSGPROPOSAL.s
+(1)MSGPROPOSALSET.s + (2f + 1)MSGPROPOSALRESPONSE.s
+(1)MSGBFTPREPREPARE.s + (2f + 1)MSGBFTPREPARE.s
+(2f + 1)MSGBFTCOMMIT.s

Appendix B
MPSSVA Validation Metrics
Here are the calculations for the MPSSVA Validation benchmarks.
B.1 Message Behavior
= (3F + 1)MSGSTARTPROTOCOL's + (3F + 1)MSGPROPOSAL's
+(1)MSGPROPOSALSET + (1)MSGPROPOSALRESPONSEACCUSE
+(3F + 1)MSGBFTPREPREPARE's + (3F + 1)MSGBFTPREPARE's
+(3F + 1)MSGBFTCOMMIT's + (3F + 1)MSGNEWPOLY's
= (3F+1)+(3F+1)+1+1+(3F+1)+(3F+1)+(3F+1)+(3F+1)
= 6*(3F+1)+2
= 18F + 8
(1)MSGSTARTPROTOCOL's + (F + 1)MSGPROPOSAL's
+(1)MSGPROPOSALSET + (2F + 1)MSGPROPOSALRESPONSE's
+(1)MSGBFTPREPREPARE + (2F + 1)MSGBFTPREPARE's
Msgs Sent
Msgs Rec
+(2F + 1)MSGBFTCOMMIT's
= 1+(F+1)+1+1+(2F+1)+(2F+1)+(2F+1)
= 3*(2F+1)+(F+1)+3
= 7F+7
B.2 Bandwidth Requirement
Bytes Sent = (3F + 1)MSGSTARTPROTOCOL.s + (3F + 1)MSGPROPOSAL.s
+(1)MSGPROPOSALSET.s + (1)MSGPROPOSALRESPONSE.s
+(3F + 1)MSGBFTPREPREPARE.s + (3F + 1)MSGBFTPREPARE.s
+(3F + 1)MSGBFTCOMMIT.s + (3F + 1)MSGNEWPOLY.s
Bytes Rec = (1)MSGSTARTPROTOCOL.s + (F + 1)MSGPROPOSAL.s
+(1)MSGPROPOSALSET.s + (2F + 1)MSGPROPOSALRESPONSE.s
+(1)MSGBFTPREPREPARE.s + (2F + 1)MSGBFTPREPARE.s
+(2F + 1)MSGBFTCOMMIT.s
B.3 Protocol Duration
Comp. Time = Computations to Send + Computations to Receive
= ((3F + 1)MSGPROPOSAL.cs + (1)MSGPROPOSALSET.cs
+(1)MSGPROPOSALRESPONSE.cs + (3F + 1)MSGNEWPOLY.cs)
+((F + 1)MSGPROPOSAL.cr + (1)MSGPROPOSALSET.cr
+(2F + 1)MSGPROPOSALRESPONSE.cr)
= (((3F + 1)E + S) + (S) + (S) + ((3F + 1)E + S))
+(((F + 1)(D + V)) + (V) + ((2F + 1)V))
= 2(3F + 1)E+4S+(F+ 1)D + ((F+1)+(2F+1) + 1)V
= (6F+6)E+4S+(F+1)D+(3F+2)V
Protocol Duration = Computation Time + Travel Time
Data Throughput
= (6F+6)E+4S+(F + 1)D+(3F+2)V +
NetworkSpeed
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